SIPRI Yearbook 2014
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
SIPRI Yearbook 2014 is a compendium of data and analysis in the areas of
- Security and conflicts
- Military spending and armaments
- Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament
These pages contain summaries and samples of the Yearbook’s contents. Printed copies are available to purchase either directly from the publisher, Oxford University Press, or elsewhere. Access to the full-text online edition is available on a subscription basis at www.sipriyearbook.org.
About SIPRI Yearbook 2014
The 45th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook includes coverage of developments during 2013 in
- The conflict in Syria
- Armed conflict
- Peace operations and conflict management
- and arms production
- World nuclear forces
- Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
- Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials
- Conventional arms control
- Dual-use and arms trade controls
and extensive annexes on
- Arms control and disarmament agreements
- International security cooperation bodies
- Events during 2013 in the area of security and arms control
Download the full contents list.
ORDER SIPRI YEARBOOK 2014
Published in print and online in 2014 by Oxford University Press on behalf of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
ISBN 978-0-19-871259-6, hardback
ISBN 978-0-19-178432-3, online
The full text of the 2014 Yearbook is now online.
A summary of SIPRI Yearbook 2014 is available in
- Catalan (FundiPau)
- (Vlaams Vredesinstituut)
- French (GRIP)
- Italian (Torino World Affairs Institute)
- Spanish (FundiPau)
- Swedish (SIPRI)
Summaries in other languages coming soon.
Global Militarisation Index 2014
The Global Militarisation Index (GMI) depicts the relative weight and importance of the military apparatus of one state in relation to its society as a whole. The update of the GMI 2014 is based on data from the year 2013 (i. e. the most recent year for which data has been available) and comprises 152 states. BICC’s GMI is supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).
In the 2014 GMI, Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Syria, Russia, Cyprus, South Korea, Jordan, Greece and Azerbaijan (rank 1 to 10) are amongst the ten countries with the highest levels of militarisation—three of which are situated in the Middle East, two in East Asia and the remaining five in Western and Eastern Europe. The high levels of militarisation in these countries are mostly the result of comprehensive arms purchases.
The causes for the generally high levels of militarisation in The Middle East are manifold. They range from the defence of existing authoritarian regimes against possible internal adversaries to external conflicts and potential threats from the outside. All in all, one will have to assume that the level of militarisation in the region will remain high or will even increase.
The neighbouring states Armenia (rank 3) and Azerbaijan (rank 10), both belonging to Europe, show very high levels of militarisation and have initiated major increases in their military expenditures over the past years. The high levels of militarisation in these two countries must, however, be seen in the overall context. Russia (rank 5) delivers arms to both South Caucasian republics and has been pursuing a comprehensive military reform since 2008.
Between 2009 and 2013, expenditures for equipment and procurement in European NATO states fell by more than US $ 9 billion. Still, some states show high levels of militarisation (Greece: 9, Estonia: 21, Turkey: 24, Bulgaria: 27, Portugal: 28).
Singapore (rank 2) and South Korea (rank 7) are the two countries within East Asia that are amongst the ten most militarised countries in the world. Singapore’s procurement efforts are a reaction to its many unresolved territorial issues, the importance of strategic waterways in the region and the Chinese anti-access / area denial strategy. South Korea’s high level of militarisation can be understood in the context of the ongoing state of war with North Korea, but also with unresolved territorial issues with Japan and China in the Yellow Sea.
Globaler Militarisierungsindex 2014 (English and German)
Press release (pdf, in English)
Press release (pdf, in German)
Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling
Authored by Dr. Colin S. Gray.
Added April 04, 2013
Download Format: PDF (http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1147)
Cyber is now recognized as an operational domain, but the theory that should explain it strategically is, for the most part, missing. It is one thing to know how to digitize; it is quite another to understand what digitization means strategically. The author maintains that, although the technical and tactical literature on cyber is abundant, strategic theoretical treatment is poor. He offers four conclusions: (1) cyber power will prove useful as an enabler of joint military operationsl; (2) cyber offense is likely to achieve some success, and the harm we suffer is most unlikely to be close to lethally damaging; (3) cyber power is only information and is only one way in which we collect, store, and transmit information; and, (4) it is clear enough today that the sky is not falling because of cyber peril. As a constructed environment, cyberspace is very much what we choose to make it. Once we shed our inappropriate awe of the scientific and technological novelty and wonder of it all, we ought to have little trouble realizing that as a strategic challenge we have met and succeeded against the like of networked computers and their electrons before. The whole record of strategic history says: Be respectful of, and adapt for, technical change, but do not panic.
Governance, Identity, And Counterinsurgency
The premise of most Western thinking on counterinsurgency is that success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy among local populations. The path to legitimacy is often seen as the improvement of governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. However, good governance is not the only possible basis for claims to legitimacy. The author considers whether, in insurgencies where ethno-religious identities are salient, claims to legitimacy may rest more on the identity of who governs, rather than on how whoever governs governs. This monograph presents an analytic framework for examining these issues and then applies that framework to two detailed local case studies of American counterinsurgency operations in Iraq: Ramadi from 2004-05; and Tal Afar from 2005-06. These case studies are based on primary research, including dozens of interviews with participants and eyewitnesses. ………Via http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1150